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DICKINSON LAIP REVIEW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA: ITS PRESENT
STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

By
HOWARD

I. FORMAN

*

Present Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law
Modern statutory administrative law in Pennsylvania may be said to have
had its origin in The Administrative Code of 1923.1 That act provided for the
reorganization of the executive and administrative work of the Commonwealth,
revision of the various govLrmmental agencies, and defined the powers ind duties
of the various executives, administrative officers, boards and departments. The
validity of this act was upheld in a decision 2 which ruled that it was proper for
a statute creating an executive agency to contain points of substantive law defining
rules of conduct, the duty to enforce which is lodged with the agency so created. The wholesale reorganization which the Act of 1923 effected can be measured
in terms of its "repealer" article 8 whereby 111 acts and parts of acts dating
from 1804 to 1921 were specifically repealed along with some 50 acts which
either were inconsistent with or were supplied by the provisions of the new act. Notwithstanding this vast modernization of Pennsylvania state administration, only
six years elapsed before another act was placed on the statute books, namely
The Administrative Code of 1929.4 This new act, although amended from
time to time, is still the law in Pennsylvania today.
Although the administrative organizational structure of the state's executive
branch thus had received a complete overhaul and benefited from the progress
made since the turn of the century in the field of public administration, there
vet remained the need for coordinating and streamlining the practice and procedure
of the various state administrative bodies. Of course, without the benefit of
such a statute the law of administrative agencies in Pennsylvania continued to
*B.S., St. Joseph's College, 1937; LL.B., Temple University, 1944; M.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1949. Member of District of Columbia, Federal Pennsylvania and Patent Office Bars. Chief,
Patent Section, Frankford Arsenal, U.S. Army Ordnance Corps. Author, Uniform State and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 Temp. L. Q. 145 (1943), 3 F.R.D. 505 (1944), Importance of the
American Patent System to the Average Lawyer, 20 Temp. L. Q. 403 (1947), 29 J. Pat. Off.
Soc'y 488 (1947), The Role of the Courts in Effecting Administrative Responsibility, 22 Temp.

L. Q. 300 (1949).

The views expressed herein are personal and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting
the views of the Ordnance Corps or of the Department of the Army.
I Act of June 7, 1923, P.L. 498, art. 1 § 1; 71
2 Commonwealth v. Snyder, 279 Pa. 234, 123
3 Act of June 7, 1932, P.L. 498, art. XXIX §
4 Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, atL 1 § 1; 71

P.S. 1-32.
A. 792 (1923).
290; 71 P.S. 31-32.
P.. 51-732.
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develop by court decision. 5 But court-made law is relatively slow and the increasing problems presented by the rapidly multiplying state agencies demanded
immediate regulation. Because of this situation, similarly experienced and treated
by its federal 6 and numerous state7 counterparts, Pennsylvania's legislature in
1945 passed the Administrative Agency Law8 and the Pennsylvania Register
Act9 (the latter since repealed). 10
Although it makes rather interesting reading and perhaps better enables
one to appreciate the intent and scope of the Administrative Agency Law, no
attempt will here be made to discuss the activities of the Joint State Government
Commission and the Pennsylvania Bar Association whose combined efforts not
only caused the law to be enacted but are presently directed to reforming that
law, for this topic is covered, more extensively than the space limitations of
the present paper permit, in a recent comprehensive article entitled "Administrative Procedure Reform in Pennsylvania"'" by Professor Clark Byse of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. Instead, the balance of this paper will
be devoted to an examination of some of the reforms presently being considered
in Pennsylvania and in certain other jurisdictions so as to form a basis for the
recommendations which conclude this analysis.
Leading Reform Proposals
It has been aptly stated that "suggestions for administrative proctdure
reform in Pennsylvania range from outright repeal of the Administrative Agency
Law to replacing it with a statute copied almost verbatim from the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act.""2 Intermediate proposals include amendment
of the present law, and adoption of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act.18 Interest in adopting, substantially unchanged, the Federal Act was displayed in the state legislature as evidenced by a bill 1' which was introduced
5 For example, in Commonwealth v. Lewis, 282 Pa. 306, 127 A. 828 (1925), it was held that
under the Administrative Code of 1923, (which provided for submission by the State Department to the Attorney General of any legal difficulty or dispute), the only questions which a department is required to submit to the Attorney General are administrative questions of legal
nature affecting the harmony which should exist between two or more executive departments,
doubtful legal questions not heretofore passed upon by the courts or the Attorney General which
affect any state officer's performance of his official duties, and proceedings which have resulted
or are likely to result in litigation in which the state has an interest.
6 Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1011 (Supp. 1946).
7 Symposium on State Administrative Procedure, 33 IowA L. REv. 193-375 (1948); Benjamin,
Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York (1942), etc.
8 Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388; 71 P.S. 1710.1-1710.51.
9 1945 P.L. 443.
10 1947 P.L. 509.
11 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 22-50 (1948). See also discussion by Byse of House Bill No. 879 in
the LEGAL INTF.LLIGENCER, Phila., July 28, 1949. The Bill, which was vetoed by the Governor,
would have made numerous amendments to the Administrative Agency Law per proposals of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, Dept. of Justice and of the Joint State Government Commission.
12 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 22, 27 (1948).
1 Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings
of the Fifty.Third Annual Conference 83-86 (1943).
14 Senate Bill No. 26 (1947).
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in the Senate and referred to the Committee on State Government, where it died.
Adoption of legislation patterned after the Federal or Model Acts was considered and rejected by the Section on Administrative Law of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association, which at the same time went on record'15 as favoring the amendatory path towards improving and extending the coverage of the state's Administrative Agency Law.
As for adopting a near verbatim copy of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act for Pennsylvania, Professor Byse has indicated some well-taken objections that the result might be the accrual of more harm than good therefrom,
recommending instead that the act's specific provisions be examined in the light
of Pennsylvania's particular needs to see if certain of those provisions could
be adopted with advantage by the commonwealth. 16 With respect to adoption
of a near verbatim copy of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act similar
objection has been made, not only by Professor Byse,' 7 but by the sponsor and
draftsmen of thv Model Act who declared that instead of such verbatim adoption
interested states should use the act "as an aid to the development of administrative procedure bills." 18 It seems, however, as though no one in Pennsylvania
has heretofore publicly expressed the viewpoint that the Model Act be studied,
along with the Federal Act and other proposals to see if there weren't some
features worthy of adapting to meet Pennsylvania's requirements. The Pennsylvania Bar Association's Section on Administrative Law specifically rejected
this possibility,19 for which reason Professor Byse didn't find it necessary even
20
to discuss this idea in his earlier named article.
Is Pennsylvania wise in paying comparatively little attention to the Federal
Act, and none at all to the Model Act in considering plans for reforming its
own law? What are the main problems involved? What has been the experience
of other jurisdictions? To seek an answer to these questions it is proposed here
to consider, by way of comparison, salient features of the present Pennsylvania
Administrative Agency Law, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act, so as to determine their similarities,
dissimilarities and possibly whether some provisions of the latter two Acts could
gainfully be utilized in amending Pennsylvania's Law.

5 Report of Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386 (1948).

16 97 U. oF PA. L. Rev. 22, 30 (1948).
17 Id at 31.

18 Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IOwA L. REV. 196, 208 (1948).
19 Report of Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386 (1948).
20 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 22, 31 (1948).

21 A fine dissertation comparing these two acts already has been
Double Standard in Administrative Procedure Legislaions Model Act
Rev. 228-251 (1948). The comparison of these two acts with each
paper with further regard to Pennsylvania's law, has largely been
analysis.

published, namely Abel, The
and Federal Act, 33 IowA L.
other, as made in the present
drawn from Professor Abel's
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Comparison Of Terms Used In Pennsylvania, Federal And
Model State Administrative Agency Acts
Each of the three acts has a section on definition of terms. Comparing
some of these definitions gives some inkling as to the different treatment
given each act. For example, the term "rule" (in Pennsylvania's act it is called
"regulation") has a common ground in all three acts in the requirement that
the term refer only to its general application to or effect on those of the public
affected by the law which the agency is charged with administering. In other
words, all three acts exclude use of the term as reference to the internal management of the agency in question. Aside from this there is considerable variance
in all three definitions. The Federal Act specifies that rate and wage orders,
and prescriptions of accounting practices, services, etc., are to be considered as
"rules". Yet this same act separately defines "orders" so as to distinguish from
"rules": the meaning given to the former ("the whole or any part of the final
disposition of any agency other than rule-making but including licensing")"*
apparently is intended to refer to the directive given individual litigants before
the agency, following decisions in actual cases passed on by the agency; while
the latter appears to have reference to general directives intended to affect all
the public coming under the agency's control.
This partial duplication of meanings and explanatory terms is ambiguous
and is bound to be confusing. The Model Act is an improvement over the
Federal Act in this regard, for the former carries no implication that would
result in confusing "orders" and "rules". Instead, the Model Act says " 'rule' includes every regulation, standard, or statement of policy or interpretation of
general application and future effect...." 23

Thus, the Model Act, without

distinguishing "rule" from "order" or other particular terms which imply
regulation, presents no cause for confusion, relying instead on general terms
like "standard, or statement of policy" to form the basis for general agency action.
The Pennsylvania Act utilizes rather odd language in defining "regulation" as
"any rule, regulation or order in the nature of a rule or regulation, generally
applicable to the public . . .but shall not be construed to include the name

or facts of any adjudication giving rise to such regulation. ' 24 In the first place,
this definition violates the well known fundamental rule that a definition shall
not recite the term being defined. In addition, it gives to the word "order"
the equivalency in meaning of a rule or regulation which will require interpretation, probably judicial, to determine when an "order" has that meaning and
when it has the meaning given it in defining it as the equivalent of the term
Federal Act § 2(d): see note 6 supra.
Model Act § 1(2); see caption of act, copy obtained from E.Blythe Stason, National Confer.
ence of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, and reproduced at 33 IowA L. REv. 372 (1948).
24 Pennsylvania Act § 1(e); see note 8 supra.
22
23
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"adjudication". 25 Finally, fault can be found with the last provision of the
definition which requires that rules aren't to be construed as including facts
of any adjudication giving rise to the regulation. What possible harm can come
if any rule were so construed? Instead of harm, good might result by making administration of the rule and judicial consideration easier when interpreted in
the light of the rule's historical development in a manner similar to the practice
of interpreting legislative intent in passing certain statutes.
No doubt all three acts lack something to be desired in their definitions
of the term "rule". Perhaps, as Professor A. S. Abel has said in comparing the
Model and Federal Acts, "no good definition can be formulated." 2 6 But if one
had to choose from among the three definitions considered above, it would
seem that the Model Act's is to be preferred for it is certainly less confusing
than the others.
The only other term defined by the Model Act is "contested case". The
Federal Act defines a similar term, namely "agency proceeding and action",
whereas the Pennsylvania Act has no counterpart of either term. The remaining
terms defined in the Pennsylvania law are "adjudication", "party", and "person",
and identical terms are defined in the Federal law. Only the definitions of the
term "adjudication" are in substantial disagreement with each other. In the
Federal law, the term refers to "agency process for the formulation of an
order"; 2 ' whereas, in the Pennsylvania law the meaning given is "final order,
decree, decision, determination, or ruling by an agency"28 as a result of the
agency process. In addition to defining the terms already identified, the Federal
Act gives consideration to "license and licensing" and "sanction and relief."
Comparison Of Provisions For Adoption, Publication
And Effective Dales of Rules
Aside from the definition of terms, a significant difference is to be noted
between the Pennsylvania Act on one hand, and the Model and Federal Acts
on the other, in the matter of adoption of rules, their publication and effective
dates. Regarding adoption, both the Model"9 and Federal 80 Acts offer the public
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings either at an oral hearing or
by written briefs. Pennsylvania's law makes no such provision. The Joint State
Government Commission thought this was wrong and proposed that public
hearings be held,8 ' although provision was made for waiving such hearings
25 Pennsylvania Act §

1(a);

see note 8 supra.

26 Abel, The Double Standard in Administrative Procedure Legislation: Model Act and Federal
Act, 33 IOWA L. REv. 228, 231 (1948).
27 Federal Act § 2(d) ; see note 6 supra.

28 Pennsylvania Act § I(a); see note 8 supra.
29 Model Act § 2(3); see note 23 supra.
8o Federal Act § 4(b); see note 6 supra.

SI Joint State Government Commission, Report to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania on Uniform Practice and Procedure Before Departments, Boards and Commissions
of the Commonwealth (1943).
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on certification by the Governor that an emergency existed 3 2 The General
Assembly, however, did not follow this recommendation. Professor Byse is of
the opinion that public hearings should not be made mandatory for a number
of reasons, but that desirable encouragement to public participation could be
given by providing that "each agency shall, to the extent and in the manner it
deems desirable, afford interested persons opportunity to participate in the process of making, amending, or repealing regulations". 88 (Italics his own.) One
cannot help but question whether this flexible provision might not be found
to be a convenient excuse for agencies to exclude all public participation. Public
hearings, as a rule, are wholesome and beneficial in forming regulations and
are definitely in conformity with the democratic process of government. So long
as we provide, as do the Model and Federal Acts, means by which the need
for such hearings can be circumvented if an emergency cause for haste should
arise, why not get full benefit of public participation in all rule-making activities
by providing for public hearings as a general rule, rather than as an exception
thereto?
In the rule-adopting process there is another provision specifically set forth
in the Model Act34 and in the Federal Act 33 which Pennsylvania might do well
to incorporate in its own law, namely that by which an agency's requirements
for practice and procedure are published and made available to all. As it is, the
section on Regulation Procedure 6 in the Pennsylvania Act could be construed
so that rules of practice and procedure of an agency must be published and made
available within thirty days after adoption, or else be considered invalid. But
there is reason to question the wisdom of having this section, which obviously
was intended principally to apply to regulations promulgated by the agency for
carrying out an agency function affecting the public, also to apply to procedural
matters before the agency. The fault to be found here is not in the failure of
the agency to hold hearings on the rules of procedure before. promulgating samefor such rules are primarily and appropriately internal housekeeping rules of
the agency and, generally speaking, the public has little vested interests therein
which would give it the right to interfere therewith-but instead the fault lies in not
making those rules public before anyone is to be held accountable for failure
to act in accordance therewith. Why permit an agency to delay publishing those
rules as much as thirty days after adoption and at the same time hold the public
responsible for compliance with those rules? How much better it would be to
follow the system of the Federal Act which specifically provides that "no person
shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not so
publishled" 37 (in the Federal Register).
82 Id at 17.
83 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 22, 34 (1948)

84
85
16
87

Model Act §
Federal Act,
Pennsylvania
Federal Act,

2(1) and (2): see note 23 supra.
§ 3(a)(2).
Act, § 2t; see note 8 supra.
§ 3(a) (3) ; see note 6 supra.
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While on the point of publication of rules, it is interesting to note some
pertinent comments recently made by Professor Abel of the Law School of West
Virginia University:
almost no state makes Lven rudimentary provision for sys. . . the states need a
statute which will do for them what the Federal Register Act and the
Federal Rules have already done for the federal administrative process." 88
tematic publication of administrative materials;

Ironically enough, this statement does apply to Pennsylvania today. Ironically,
it must be said for Pennsylvania that it did have only a few years ago a statute 9
which provided for an annual publication known as the Pennsylvania Register. The
register act required that all administrative agency regulations be published in
the Pennsylvania Register within forty-five days after their adoption. Two years
later, however, in 1947, the act was repealed so that today there prevails the
above described provision40 that no regulation shall have any effect unless printed and made available within thirty days after adoption.
The need for some publication like the Pennsylvania Register has long
been recognized, but even those in favor of some such publication may object
to re-adopting the Register because it is an expensive proposition, and may
tend to become cumbersome. 41 A study of Pennsylvania's exptrience would
seem to indicate that if not an actual revival of the Register, something akin
thereto is bound to be found necessary. This observer's feeling in this matter
is that Pennsylvania could do worse than to adopt the Model Act's provision
on this point. The Model Act's Section 4 provides for this much-needed type of
publication, yet as Professor Abel has remarked, keeps the organ "within the
limits of the states' more modest budgets-by confining to an existing state
functionary-the secretary of state . . .- the duty of preparing a compilation
and index of administrative rules in being at the act's effective date and publishing it plus a monthly bulletin thereafter of rules newly filed by the agencies
in conformity with a mandate that every agency file with such official a certified
4
copy of each rule as adopted."'
Another expense-saving feature of the Model Act is a provision that the
Secretary of State may in his discretion omit from the register rules whose publication would be unduly cumbersome and expensive, if such rules are printed
and made available on application to the agency involved, and if the register
contains a notice stating the general subject matter of the rules so omitted
29 33 1owA L. REV. 228, 251 (1948).
89 Pennsylvania Register Act,
1710.101-1710.111.
40 Pennsylvania Act, § 21, see
41 97 U. ov PA. L. Rv. 22,
42 33 IowA L. Rev. 228, 244

Pa. Laws 1945, No. 443, repealed by 1947 P.L. 509; 71 P.S.

note 8 supra.
36 (1948).
(1948).
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and information as to how copies thereof may be obtained. 4! This seems to be
a sensible and adequate compromise between the Federal Register with its burden
of expense and cumbersomeness and the pres'ent Pennsyvlania system which
provides for no such compilation, and is a phase of the Model Act which seems
worthy of adoption in toto by Pennsylvania.
Other Provisions Of Model And Federal Acts Recommended
For Inclusion In Pennsylvania'sLaw
The remaining points of comparison of the three acts which have been
singled out for brief discussion here are those of "declaratory type decisions"
and "informal disposition of cases". Of the first named point there are two
distinct types of decisions to be considered, one being declaratory judgmtnts
and the other being declaratory rulings; the former will be taken up first.
Declaratory judgments are provided for in both the Model Act 44 and the
Federal Act,45 but not in the Pennsylvania Act. The Section on Administrative
Law of the Pennsylvania Bar Association has consistently favored adoption of
a declaratory judgment law for review of decisions by Pennsylvania's administrative agencies. 4'6 The Joint State Government Commission in its 1943 Report
to the General Assembly sought power for itself to void administrative rules or
regulations if it felt that those rules were contrary to an Act of Assembly.47
It is doubtful whether the Joint Commission has the judicial experience necessary
to pass on the diverse and technical regulations of administrative agencies, and
this suggestion is one which should not be entertained too seriously. Clearly
such decisions should be made only in a court of law and in accordance with
time-tested experiences and practices in declaratory judgment proceedings.
The matter of declaratory rulings by agencies is a phase of state administrative law apparently not touched on by the Pennsylvania Law. Such declaratory
rulings are, however, provided for by both the Model Act'6 and the Federal
Act; 4" although the former is more complete in explanation and scope, both
serve the same good purpose of enabling an agency to issue such a ruling
whereby to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty concerning the applicability of a given rule or statute to particular parties or objects. It seems likely
that such rulings would eliminate confusion, needless hearings, and make for
48 Model Act § 4(3) ; see note 23 supra.
44 Model Act, § 6; see note 23 supra.
45 Federal Act, § 10(b) ; see note 6 supra.
48 Section's 1942 draft of Administrative Agency Law, § 305, 48 PA. B. A. REP. 243' (1942):
also see 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386, 387 (1948) for report on Section's efforts to get such a bill adopted
into law.
47 joint State Government Commission, Report to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania on Uniform Practice and Procedure Before Departments, Boards and Commissions
of the Commonwealth (1943), at 5, 7 and 17.
48 Model Act § 7; see note 23 supra.

49 Federal Act § 5(d); see note 6 supra.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA

general agency enforcement efficiency, and in the light of this observation, the
Pennsylvania Act could be benefited by including a provision for declaratory
ralings.
The matter of informal disposition of cases, which also appears to have
been given no specific consideration by the drafters of the Pennsylvania Agency
Law, is expressly provided for in the Model Act 5" and to a less specific degree
inthe Federal Act. 51 The Model Act's provision clearly calls for settlements
'out of court", so to speak, by saying any contested case may be disposed of
by "stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, or default." The Model Act
is not quite so informal, stipulating that the agencies are required to receive
offers "of settlement or proposals of adjustment." As mentioned in the explanation to this subsection in the Federal Act: "Even courts through pretrial proceedings dispose of much of their business in that fashion. There is
much more reason to do so in the administrative process, for informal procedures constitute the vast bulk of administrative adjudication and are truly
the lifeblood of the administrative process."2 Perhaps if Pennsylvania were to
incorporate such a provision in its Administrative Agency Law, fewer matters
would be found to require formal agency hearing or judicial review. Surely such
a proviso could cause no harm, and yet it might cause considerable benefit
by way of reducing time-consuming agency hearings.
Concu.rions
As probably has been obvious the author's prime purpose in comparing
selected features of the Pennsylvania, Model and Federal Acts has been to shed
some light on relative weaknesses in the Pennsylvania Law which, at least to
his mind, could be improved by substituting therefor analogous provisions of
the other two acts. No implications are thereby to be gathered that the Pennsylvania law as it now stands is inferior to the other two acts, for in some
particulars the opposite is in fact true. Describing the three in broad generalities,
it might be said that Pennsylvania's statute is couched in the more general
language which may give both the agencies and the reviewing courts desirable
latitude in interpreting the act's scope and intent. For example, from this standpoint, the section on Judicial Review in the Pennsylvania Agency Law, permitting as it does the following of existing rules of court, is quite adequate, if
not preferable to comparable provisions in the Model and Federal Acts which
set forth rather narrow and untested rules for conducting such review.
With regard to the question of detailed treatment, however, my preference
leans to the Federal Act which is by far the most comprehensive of the three
laws (albeit that it has four less sections than the Model Act). However, the
60 Model Act, § 8; see note 23 supra.
61 Federal Act, § 5(b); see note 6 supra.
62 Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative History, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., Senate Doc. No. 248
(1946), 24.
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Federal Act reflects its history of last-minute rush to overcome unreconciled
differences and enact it into law, and has ambiguities and contradictions which
should not be copied verbatim by Pennsylvania or any other state that wants
to use the federal draft as a model. Instead, a comprehensive codification is
favored in revising the Pennsylvania Agency Law, but only if the result is to
be a thorough, well planned work, fully deliberated upon by experts in the
field and the interested public.
As to specific provisions of the Model and Federal Acts which it is recom.
mended that Pennsylvania should adopt, there are a few that it is desired to stress.
First, the Model or Federal Act's methods of adopting rules which call for
a public pre-adoption hearing. Second, the Model Act's plan of publishing
the rules in a public register except in certain cases where the Secretary of
State finds it would be too expensive and cumbersome, and in such cases, provide for the publishing of notice of the omission. Third, adoption of declaratory
judgment provisions which grace both the Model and Federal Acts. Fourth and
fifth, again in the latter two statutes only, provisions for declaratory rulings
by agencies, and for informal disposition of cases.
As a final word on the subject of recommendations for improvement of
Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law, it is hoped that the foregoing has
shown good reason why the Federal and Model Acts should not be overlooked
when suggestions for reform are sought. While I'd be loath to recommend adoption
by Pennsylvania of either of the latter two acts in loto, I'd just as strongly urge
that both have good building material which could be salvaged to good advantage
for the proposed "rebuilding" of the Administrative Agency Law of Pennsylvania.

